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THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: HOW REVIEW OF
NATURAL GAS EXPORTS HIDES ENVIRONMENTAL
EFFECTS IN PLAIN SIGHT
Julia Michel*
Abstract
Often called the “Magna Carta” of environmental laws, the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) has made informed
decision-making about the environment a pre-requisite for
every major federal permit approval. By requiring federal
agencies to systematically consider and disclose the
environmental and health consequences of a course of action,
NEPA also made federal decision-making public—”we know
best” no longer suffices to allow agencies to make a decision
without considering its environmental consequences. Yet
NEPA’s mandate has been thwarted when it comes to natural
gas exports. Without meaningful review of the consequences,
federal agencies have already approved proposals to export an
amount roughly equivalent to one-fifth of all domestic natural
gas demand. In so doing, they have failed to consider basic
consequences such as rising domestic prices, production, and
pollution. This Note argues that recent decisions by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit have allowed federal
agencies to hide the impacts of natural gas exports in an
improperly segmented review process. Because the public and
local decision-makers deserve—and NEPA requires—an
honest assessment of the impacts associated with natural gas
exports, this Note urges judges and advocates to consider
segmentation as a critical legal principle for understanding
why the D.C. Circuit’s recent decisions have created a void in
environmental review and should be reconsidered.
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INTRODUCTION
Due in large part to the development of hydraulic fracturing
(“fracking”) drilling techniques,1 U.S. production and use of
natural gas has swelled over the last decade. The increased
availability of cheap domestic natural gas has reduced the
demand for imported gas, prompting owners of natural gas
import terminals to reconfigure their facilities to export gas to
international markets.2
If natural gas exports continue to rise, 3 so too will increased
domestic natural gas production and its associated
environmental
impacts.
Studies
have
consistently

* Juris Doctor, University of Washington School of Law. I am thankful for the
insight and guidance of my advisor, Professor Sanne Knudsen, and the editing by
Devin Kesner and the WJELP editorial staff.
1. See 80 Fed. Reg. 18,557, 18,559 (Apr. 7, 2015) (noting that as a result of these
developments the United States’ natural gas production has reached its highest level
in 30 years).
2. Id.
3. U.S. Natural Gas Imports & Exports 2016, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 29,
2017), https://www.eia.gov/naturalgas/importsexports/annual/ [https://perma.cc/Y4GAQPZ8] (indicating that natural gas exports in 2016 were more than triple the level in
2006).
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demonstrated that sixty to seventy percent of the exported gas
will be from new domestic gas production; that increased
exports raise domestic natural gas prices; and that as natural
gas prices increase, the electric power sector will shift back to
coal-fired generation.4 Despite the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA), which requires all federal agencies to
conduct a meaningful review of the environmental effects of
proposed projects,5 the effects of natural gas exports remain
hidden in a “tangled web” of regulation.6
Operators of a natural gas terminal seeking to construct or
reconfigure facilities for export must obtain authorization from
the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and also
seek a permit to export the gas from the Department of Energy
(DOE or the Department).7 While each permit triggers
environmental review under NEPA,8 neither agency fully
considers environmental impacts as a pre-requisite for
authorizing natural gas exports.
Environmental groups have mounted litigation to pin down
where the responsibility for a sensible and more
comprehensive environmental review lies. To date, they have
failed.9 Rejecting the first wave of challenges to FERC
approvals for the construction and operation of export
facilities, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that DOE’s
separate authorization for exporting the gas “absolves” FERC
of its responsibility to assess the indirect effects of approving
4. See, e.g., U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., EFFECTS OF INCREASED NATURAL GAS
EXPORTS
ON
DOMESTIC
ENERGY
MARKETS
6
(2012),
https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/fe/pdf/fe_lng.pdf [https://perma.cc/U7MA-7VYX].
5. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
6. Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Freeport I), 827 F.3d 36, 40 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
7. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2012); MICHAEL RATNER ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., R42074,
U.S. NATURAL GAS EXPORTS: NEW OPPORTUNITIES, UNCERTAIN OUTCOMES 14 (2015),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42074.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y6Q7-F5JS].
8. See generally 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). Environmental reviews are not
required for actions covered by a “categorical exclusion,” or when an agency makes a
“finding of no significant impact.” 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4 (2017).
9. The challenges were to FERC’s approval of Dominion Resources Inc.’s Cove Point
liquefied natural gas (LNG) project in Maryland (“Cove Point”), EarthReports, Inc. v.
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n (EarthReports), 828 F.3d 949, 955 (D.C. Cir. 2016);
Cheniere Energy Inc.’s Sabine Pass LNG project in Louisiana, Sierra Club v. Fed.
Energy Regulatory Comm’n (Sabine), 827 F.3d 59, 68–69 (D.C. Cir. 2016); and the
Freeport LNG project in Texas, Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 40.
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export facilities.10 Parallel challenges to DOE’s environmental
review fared no better.11 The result is that neither the agencies
nor the public clearly understand the environmental impacts
of each liquefied natural gas (LNG) 12 export terminal.
The D.C. Circuit’s decisions raise a fundamental question:
have DOE and FERC improperly evaded disclosure of the
environmental impacts of authorizing LNG exports? Setting
aside the question of whether FERC and DOE reviews reflect
an inappropriate bias toward approval of LNG permits, this
Note argues that the two agencies have thwarted NEPA’s
requirement that agencies take a “hard look” at the
environmental effects of proposed actions before approval.13
This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I introduces the
Natural Gas Act and gives a brief overview of how the parallel
FERC and DOE processes operate. The section also describes
the NEPA framework, its purpose, and how courts have
applied its various timing and scoping requirements to ensure
that agencies provide a detailed review of a project’s
environmental effects.
Part II explains how NEPA and the Natural Gas Act operate
in action. Using the recent Freeport LNG terminal and
associated litigation as an example, this section walks through
the D.C. Circuit’s emerging framework for evaluating NEPA
challenges to natural gas export authorizations. Part II also
explores why the D.C. Circuit’s framework leaves an
unacceptable void in environmental review.

10. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 48; see also EarthReports, 828 F.3d at 956; Sabine, 827
F.3d at 68.
11. Sierra Club v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy (Freeport II), 867 F.3d 189, 196–97 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
12. More than 600 times more condensed than its vapor form, LNG is stored and
transported more easily, and is thus suitable for exporting. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY,
DOE/FE-0849, LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS: UNDERSTANDING THE BASIC FACTS 3 (2005),
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2013/04/f0/LNG_primerupd.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7MVN-YWM9] (explaining that LNG is natural gas cooled to the
temperature at which the vapor liquefies and stating that natural gas vaporizes at
-260°F/-162°C).
13. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989); see also
42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012) (requiring federal agencies to include a discussion of “the
environmental impact of the proposed action” and “any adverse environmental effects
which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented” in their NEPA
analyses).
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Part III identifies problems with the D.C. Circuit’s
reasoning. Specifically, the court appears to misconstrue a
Supreme Court case, Department of Transportation v. Public
Citizen,14 as a blank check for FERC to evade a complete
environmental review of impacts associated with exportinduced natural gas production. Additionally, the court has
failed to explain why DOE’s generalized assessment of
environmental impacts—untethered from the specific export
proposal under review—nonetheless satisfies NEPA’s
requirement for a “hard look” review.
Finally, Part IV examines areas for potential future
challenges by returning to a familiar doctrine in NEPA case
law: the prohibition on “illegally segmenting projects in order
to avoid consideration of an entire action’s effects on the
environment[.]”15
Applying
NEPA’s
anti-segmentation
principles to the current two-step review of LNG export
facilities could force the respective agencies to unify their
review and provide the public with the honest assessment it
deserves.
I.

THE RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORKS DO
NOT SUPPORT INCOMPLETE ENVIRONMENTAL
REVIEW

The statutory frameworks governing natural gas exports—
namely NEPA16 and the Natural Gas Act17—do not, on their
face, support incomplete environmental reviews of natural gas
exports. Rather, NEPA’s information-forcing regime should
inform FERC and DOE’s substantive decisions.18 Therefore,
understanding how the two statutory schemes operate in
tandem is a prerequisite to understanding the degree to which
the D.C. Circuit has allowed FERC and DOE to evade their
responsibilities
to
analyze
and
disclose
significant

14. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
15. See W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 1997).
16. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2012).
17. 15 U.S.C. § 717b (2012).
18. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 347; see also 40 C.F.R. § 5001.1(c) (2017) (“The NEPA
process is intended to help public officials make decisions that are based on
understanding of environmental consequences, and take actions that protect, restore,
and enhance the environment.”).
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environmental impacts of projects they approve. Ultimately,
allowing such serious deficiencies in the NEPA review runs the
risk of infecting the agencies’ substantive public interest
determinations in an arbitrary and capricious review. Stated
otherwise, the failure to identify or characterize the
incremental environmental impacts of LNG exports
undermines any conclusion that these impacts would be
outweighed by the benefits.
A.

The Natural Gas Act

The Natural Gas Act grants FERC the authority to approve
the siting, construction, expansion, and operation of an LNG
export terminal unless it finds that approval would be
inconsistent with the public interest. 19 FERC has stated that
the Natural Gas Act “sets out a general presumption favoring.
. .authorization” for applications to modify natural gas
terminals.20 FERC has also taken the position that public
interest review is limited to the economic and environmental
impacts of “the proposal before us,” i.e., limited to the impacts
associated with the facilities used to allow exports, but not the
impacts of the exports themselves. 21
FERC has defended its view that only the direct
environmental impacts of a facility matter for its public
interest determination in a round-about way. Specifically, it
has stated that its regulatory functions vis-à-vis LNG export
facilities were transferred to the Secretary of Energy in 1977
in the Department of Energy Organization Act;22 that the
Secretary subsequently delegated back to FERC the authority
to approve or disapprove the construction and operation of
particular facilities;23 but that the Secretary’s delegation of
19. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012) (“The
Commission shall have the exclusive authority to approve or deny an application for
the siting, construction, expansion, or operation of an LNG [liquefied natural gas]
terminal.”); RATNER ET AL., supra note 7, at 14.
20. Respondent’s Opening Brief at 6, Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. July 17, 2015)
(No. 14-1275) (citing Va. Pub. Servs. Comm’n v. Dep’t of Energy, 681 F.2d 847, 856
(D.C. Cir. 1982)).
21. See Order Granting Authorizations Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act,
Freeport LNG Development, L.P., 148 FERC ¶ 61,076, 9–10 (July 30, 2014).
22. Id. at 8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b)).
23. Id. (citing DOE Delegation Order No. 00-044.00A).
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authority does not permit FERC to consider the indirect
environmental impacts of a particular facility.24
Courts have neither blessed FERC’s interpretations of the
DOE delegation order nor outlined the precise scope of FERC’s
actual authority under the delegation.25 The answers to these
questions may have important implications in future cases.
Nevertheless, even if FERC need only consider the
environmental impacts directly surrounding a proposed facility
for purposes of its Natural Gas Act-mandated public interest
determination, its environmental review mandated by NEPA
would still need to discuss anticipated environmental impacts
occurring further afield.26 After all, neither the Natural Gas
Act nor DOE’s delegation order purports to override NEPA’s
independent requirement that agencies document the indirect
impacts of a proposal.27
In any event, in addition to securing FERC’s approval for
the construction and operation of the export facility, parties
seeking to export natural gas also file for an export
authorization under the rules and procedures established by
DOE.28 Proposals to export gas to a “free trade” nation receive
automatic authorization from DOE.29 In other words, in some
instances, the only review standing between a proposal to
build LNG export facilities and international markets is
FERC’s public interest assessment.30 Before granting
24. See id. at 8–10. FERC subsequently re-characterized its decision to decline
consideration of indirect effects, defending its decision on the grounds that the
potential environmental effects were not sufficiently causally related to the project
under review. Order Denying Rehearing and Clarification, Freeport LNG
Development, L.P., 149 FERC ¶ 61,119, 10 (Nov. 13, 2014).
25. See Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 45 (expressly not deciding the “propriety or scope of
the Commission’s delegated authority under the Natural Gas Act”).
26. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2017). NEPA will be
covered in more detail in Section II.B.
27. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012); 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2017).
28. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012). DOE regulations implementing those requirements
were promulgated at 10 C.F.R. pt. 590 (2017), “Administrative Procedures with
Respect to the Import and Export of Natural Gas.” While section 717b(a) appears to
require FERC’s approval for the export of natural gas, this function was transferred to
the Secretary of Energy in 1977 pursuant to section 301(b) of the Department of
Energy Organization Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7151(b) (2012).
29. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2012).
30. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 40; see also Answering Brief for Respondent at 5, Freeport
II, 867 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. May 23, 2016) (No. 15-1489).
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applications to export gas to a country with which the United
States has no free trade agreement, however, DOE must
independently determine whether such exports would be
inconsistent with the public interest. 31
DOE recognizes that its public interest review requires an
assessment of environmental impacts 32 but has taken the
position that the Natural Gas Act does not impose
environmental review obligations greater than those already
required under NEPA.33 Nevertheless, the relevance of
environmental impacts to DOE’s public interest review
indicates how much DOE relies on an honest, comprehensive
NEPA analysis to inform its substantive public interest
determination.34 In other words, deficiencies in DOE’s
environmental review required by NEPA run the risk of
infecting its substantive public interest determinations;
presumably, without characterizing or evaluating the severity
of environmental impacts, DOE would have no basis for
concluding that the exports’ benefits are outweighed by
environmental harms.
DOE and FERC’s responsibilities to chronicle environmental
impacts are not just implicit in the Natural Gas Act’s public
interest determinations. The Act explicitly establishes a
protocol to ensure compliance with environmental reviews
required by NEPA by designating FERC as “the lead agency
for the purposes of coordinating all applicable Federal
authorizations and for the purposes of complying with
[NEPA].”35 The D.C. Circuit has interpreted this to mean that,
for purposes of FERC’s environmental reviews, DOE
participates as a “cooperating agency.”36 Then, DOE may adopt
31. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012).
32. See Answering Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 60 (noting DOE’s duty is
to identify and evaluate the factors relevant to the public interest, specifically listing
environmental factors); see also id. at 36 (noting DOE considered a study estimating
indirect greenhouse gas emissions across all proposed exports, but not the specific
facility at issue).
33. Id. at 60.
34. In fact, DOE regulations specifically enlist the applicants themselves in the
environmental review process, requiring export applications to include the potential
environmental impacts of the project. 10 C.F.R. § 590.202(b)(7) (2017).
35. 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
36. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 41–
42 (D.C. Cir. 2016)).
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FERC’s environmental analysis as its own for purposes of the
NEPA review triggered by an export-authorization request,
provided that DOE “independently review[s]” FERC’s work
and concludes that DOE’s own “comments and suggestions
have been satisfied.”37
B.

The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)

Often called the “Magna Carta”38 of environmental laws,
NEPA creates an information-forcing regime to serve “twin
aims”: (1) to ensure that all federal agencies have considered
every significant aspect of the environmental impact of a
proposed action; and (2) to guarantee that the public is made
aware of the consequences of an agency’s decisions, enabling
interested persons to participate in deciding what projects
agencies should approve and under what terms. 39 With NEPA,
the hope was that agencies’ “we know best” approach that
ignored environmental consequences would become a thing of
the past.40
As an umbrella statute, NEPA applies to all federal
agencies, regardless of their underlying substantive mandates.
Specifically, NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare a
“detailed statement,” known as an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS), on the environmental impacts of proposed
legislation and major federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.41 An EIS must discuss,
37. Id.
38. See Daniel R. Mandelker, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Review of Its
Experience and Problems, 32 WASH. U.J.L. & POL’Y 293, 293 (2010).
39. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004); Baltimore Gas & Elec.
Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983); Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 347 (1989).
40. ENVTL. LAW INST., NEPA SUCCESS STORIES: CELEBRATING 40 YEARS OF
TRANSPARENCY AND OPEN GOVERNMENT 3 (2010), http://www.eli.org/researchreport/nepa-success-stories-celebrating-40-years-transparency-and-opengovernment [http://perma.cc/8yuk-r7ud].
41. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012). Because consideration of a “major federal action[]
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment” is what triggers the
requirement to prepare an EIS, agencies can also first prepare a smaller, shorter
document called an Environmental Assessment (EA) to determine whether an EIS is
required. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 757. If the EA indicates that no significant impact
is likely, then the agency can release a finding of no significant impact (FONSI) and
carry on with the proposed action. Id. at 757–58. Otherwise, the agency must then
conduct a full-scale EIS. See id.

Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2018

9

Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Vol. 8, Iss. 2 [2018], Art. 3

2018]

THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

307

inter alia: (1) the environmental impacts of the proposed
action; (2) the unavoidable adverse environmental effects
should the proposed course of action be implemented; (3)
alternatives to the proposed action; and (4) whether the
proposed action may result in the irreversible and irretrievable
commitment of resources.42 The Environmental Protection
Agency’s Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) has
promulgated regulations concerning the scope, extent, and
timing of an EIS. 43 These regulations bind federal agencies by
executive order and receive “substantial deference” from
courts.44
1.

NEPA Requires Analyzing Indirect Effects, Including
Upstream Emissions

Adequately analyzing the environmental impact of a
proposed project requires agencies to consider three kinds of
environmental effects. First, “direct” effects are those that “are
caused by the action and occur at the same time and place,”45
such as the local environmental effects associated with
constructing or modifying an LNG export facility. Second,
agencies must also consider “indirect” environmental effects
that “are caused by the action and are later in time or farther
removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable.”46 For
example, in a case involving a new railway that would reduce
the cost of delivering coal, the permitting agency was required
to address the resulting increase in coal consumption and the
effects thereof as “indirect effects.”47 Finally, an agency must
consider an action’s “cumulative impact”—the impact on the
environment that would result “from the incremental impact of
the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably

42. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012).
43. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500–1508 (2017).
44. Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. Norton, 433 F.3d 852, 861 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(citing Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 358 (1979)).
45. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8 (2017).
46. Id.
47. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549–50 (8th
Cir. 2003).
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foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (federal or
non-federal) or person undertakes such other actions.”48
For fossil fuel extraction or infrastructure projects, litigation
often centers on whether the environmental review considers
all of the indirect effects that reasonably result from a
proposed project. Akin to the notion of proximate cause in tort
law, an impact is “reasonably foreseeable” if a person of
ordinary prudence would take it into account in reaching a
decision.49 The process can boil down to “look[ing] to the
underlying policies or legislative intent in order to draw a
manageable line between those causal changes that may make
an actor responsible for an effect and those that do not.”50
Thus, agencies seeking to avoid review of indirect effects
may argue that indirect effects—such as domestic greenhouse
gas emissions from export-triggered natural gas production—
are not reasonably foreseeable. The D.C. Circuit’s recent
decision in Sierra Club v. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission indicates that environmental groups may be able
to overcome this hurdle by appealing to the project’s purpose.51
For example, in Sierra Club, environmental groups and
landowners challenged FERC’s decision to approve the
construction and operation of three new interstate natural gas
pipelines in the southeastern United States. 52 The challengers’
primary argument was that FERC had failed to assess the
downstream environmental impacts of the pipeline, namely
the greenhouse gas emissions that would result from burning
gas carried by the new pipelines. 53 The D.C. Circuit agreed,
pointing out that if the purpose of building pipelines was to
transport the gas for its use, greenhouse gas emissions
resulting from its use were surely foreseeable.54

48. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (2017).
49. Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2016); City of Shoreacres v. Waterworth,
420 F.3d 440, 453 (5th Cir. 2005); Sierra Club v. Marsh, 976 F.2d 763, 767 (1st Cir.
1992).
50. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 767 (2004) (quoting Metro. Edison
Co. v. People Against Nuclear Energy, 460 U.S. 766, 774 (1983)).
51. See Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1374 (D.C.
Cir. 2017).
52. Id. at 1363.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1371–72 (“What are the ‘reasonably foreseeable’ effects of authorizing a
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Occasionally, the dearth of adequate information regarding
a project’s indirect effects makes meaningful analysis
impossible. Thus, while CEQ regulations expressly address
how agencies should handle missing or incomplete information
about potentially significant environmental impacts,55 the
feasibility of estimating environmental effects can bleed into a
court’s analysis of whether those effects are foreseeable.56
NEPA reviews, however, necessarily involve some reasonable
forecasting, and agencies may sometimes need to make
educated assumptions because it is their responsibility to
predict the environmental effects of a proposed action before
those effects are fully known. 57 In other words, courts have
refused to allow agencies to shirk their responsibility by
merely “labeling any and all discussion of future
environmental effects as a ‘crystal ball inquiry.’”58
Furthermore, even if the extent of the effect is speculative,
the nature of the effect may be reasonably foreseeable,
meaning that an agency cannot simply ignore this effect in its
NEPA review. For example, in Mid States Coalition for
Progress v. Surface Transportation Board, the Eighth Circuit
found inadequate the Surface Transportation Board’s (STB)
EIS analyzing the construction and rehabilitation of rail lines
to service coal mines in Wyoming’s Powder River Basin.59
Environmental groups argued that STB had failed to consider
greenhouse gas effects associated with an increase in supply of
pipeline that will transport natural gas to Florida power plants? First, that gas will be
burned in those power plants. This is not just ‘reasonably foreseeable,’ it is the
project’s entire purpose, as the pipeline developers themselves explain.”).
55. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(a) (2017) (requiring agencies to obtain missing
information essential to a reasoned choice among alternatives, unless the costs of
obtaining the information are exorbitant or the information is simply unavailable).
56. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1373–74.
57. Albert C. Lin notes that both tort law and NEPA use the term “foreseeable,” but
in different ways. Albert C. Lin, Erosive Interpretation of Environmental Law in the
Supreme Court’s 2003-04 Term, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 565, 610 (2005). In tort law,
proximate cause is a screening device to limit liability by asking what is fair to impose
on the defendant. See id. By contrast, NEPA does not involve substantive liability, and
the statute’s information-forcing aims favor a broader disclosure of effects, so a less
restrictive version of causation is appropriate. See id.
58. Scientists’ Inst. for Pub. Info., Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm’n, 481 F.2d 1079,
1092 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
59. Mid States Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549–50 (8th
Cir. 2003).
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coal to power plants that would occur as a result of the
upgrades.60 STB argued that it would “need to know where
[the power plants would] be built, and how much coal these
new unnamed power plants would use” in order to analyze
emissions from increased coal consumption.61 The Eighth
Circuit concluded that even if the full extent of the
environmental impacts of the increased coal usage was not
known, the nature of the ensuing environmental effects plainly
was.62 “[W]hen the nature of the effect is reasonably
foreseeable but its extent is not,” the court concluded, an
agency “may not simply ignore the effect” in its NEPA
review.63
The nature-extent dichotomy is important because, as
discussed below, one of the studies in the record before FERC
and DOE regarding the Freeport LNG Terminal expressly
concluded that increased natural gas exports raise domestic
natural gas prices, reduce domestic natural gas consumption,
and shift the electric power sector back to coal-fired
generation.64 Because the nature of these effects of increased
LNG exports are reasonably foreseeable, one would expect a
court to insist that these impacts receive due attention.
Occasionally an agency will not dispute that foreseeable
indirect effects would have major environmental consequences
but claim that they can lawfully ignore these effects because
they are not directly caused by the agency’s decision.
Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen65 offers these
agencies a Supreme Court case to cite in support of this
proposition. The litigation in Public Citizen followed President
Bush’s announcement that he intended to end a moratorium
that prevented Mexican trucks from operating within the
United States.66 Congress subsequently passed legislation
barring the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration
(FMCSA) from spending funds to process applications for

60. Id. at 549–50.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 549.
Id.
Id. (emphasis in original).
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 4, at 6.
541 U.S. 752, 770 (2004).
Id. at 760.
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Mexican trucks to operate in the United States until it issued
rules containing certain safety-monitoring requirements.67
Accordingly, FMCSA promulgated rules to establish an
application and safety inspection regime for Mexican trucks
seeking to conduct cross-border operations.68 FMCSA prepared
an Environmental Assessment of its new rules.69 The
assessment only considered the direct environmental effects of
the proposed regulations—i.e., the impacts of increasing the
number of roadside inspections of Mexican trucks—and
ignored the proposed regulation’s indirect environmental
impacts, namely greenhouse gas emissions resulting from the
increased presence of Mexican trucks in the United States.70
Environmental groups challenged the rules, arguing that
FMCSA violated NEPA by failing to consider the effects of
increased Mexican truck traffic that would result from lifting
the moratorium.71 The Supreme Court unanimously held that
NEPA did not require such an evaluation. 72 It reasoned that
“where an agency has no ability to prevent a certain effect due
to its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions, the
agency cannot be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of the
effect.”73 In other words, because only the President, and not
the agency, could authorize (or not authorize) cross-border
operations from Mexican motor carriers, the agency did not
need to consider the environmental effects arising from the
entry of Mexican trucks.74
At least in the natural gas pipeline context, the D.C. Circuit
has not applied an overly-expansive reading of Public Citizen.
For example, in the above-mentioned Sierra Club v. Federal

67. Id.
68. See id. at 760–62.
69. As explained in supra text accompanying note 41 and Section III.A, the
difference between an EIS and an EA is important. Public Citizen challenged
FMCSA’s decision to perform the more limited EA rather than an EIS. Pub. Citizen,
541 U.S. at 765. Essentially, it argued that had the agency taken account of the
indirect impact of the increased trucks, it would have been significant enough to
warrant an EIS. Id. at 763.
70. Id. at 754.
71. Id. at 763.
72. Id. at 754–55.
73. Id. at 770 (internal quotations omitted).
74. Id.
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Energy Regulatory Commission, environmental groups claimed
that FERC’s environmental review for new pipelines to service
Florida power plants should have assessed greenhouse gas
emissions from the new and existing power plants.75
Like the two-tiered statutory framework at issue in Public
Citizen, under Florida law, the Florida Power Plant Board
authorizes new power plants but FERC authorizes the
construction of interstate pipelines necessary to carry the
natural gas.76 The D.C. Circuit still found, however, that FERC
needed to assess the resulting emissions. The court’s decision
to avoid an overly-broad application of Public Citizen makes
sense. Had the D.C. Circuit allowed FERC to ignore the
emissions resulting from its decision to authorize new
pipelines, it would have eviscerated NEPA regulations calling
for consideration of “growth-inducing effects” and run counter
to case law requiring agencies to evaluate effects outside of
their jurisdiction.77
2.

NEPA Requires Agencies to Consider “Connected Actions”

In addition to considering indirect effects of granting a
permit for a fossil fuel infrastructure project, NEPA requires
agencies to consider the environmental effects of actions
“connected” to the one under review.78 Per CEQ regulations,
agencies must prepare a single environmental review when the
proposal under review:
(i) Automatically trigger[s] other actions which may
require environmental impact statements.
(ii) Cannot or will not proceed unless other actions are
taken previously or simultaneously.

75. Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373–74, 1381
(D.C. Cir. 2017).
76. Id. at 1381.
77. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. U.S. Atomic Energy
Comm’n, 449 F.2d 1109, 1122–23 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (noting NEPA would “wither away
in disuse, [if] applied only to those environmental issues wholly unregulated by any
other federal, state or regional body”); see also Ark. Nature All. v. U.S. Army Corps of
Eng’rs, 266 F. Supp.2d 876, 891–92 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Friends of the Earth v. U.S.
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 109 F. Supp.2d 30, 40–41 (D.D.C. 2000).
78. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (2017).
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(iii) Are interdependent parts of a larger action and
depend on the larger action for their justification.79
This anti-segmentation principle guards against dividing a
project into multiple proposals, and separately analyzing each
of the portions to avoid consideration of an entire action’s
effects on the environment.80
Thomas v. Peterson81 is the leading case exemplifying how
courts use an “independent utility” test to ferret out improper
segmentation. In Thomas, the Forest Service approved a
logging road designed to transport timber from pending timber
sales. “It is clear,” the Ninth Circuit stated, “that the timber
sales cannot proceed without the road, and the road would not
be built but for the contemplated timber sales.”82 The court
ordered the Forest Service to prepare and consider an EIS that
analyzed the combined impacts of the road and the timber
sales. If the timber sales were sufficiently certain to justify
construction of the road, the Ninth Circuit concluded, then
they were sufficiently certain for their environmental impacts
to be analyzed along with those of the road.83 More recently,
the D.C. Circuit considered connected actions in the natural
gas infrastructure context. Reiterating the independent utility
test, the court concluded that FERC improperly segmented
review of a series of financially and functionally
interdependent natural gas pipeline improvements. 84
Considering the attention that both CEQ regulations and
courts have given to ensure that the scope of environmental
reviews is properly defined, one might expect the anti79. Id.
80. See W. Radio Servs. Co. v. Glickman, 123 F.3d 1189, 1194 (9th Cir. 1997)
(explaining that NEPA prevents an agency from “illegally segmenting projects in order
to avoid consideration of an entire action’s effects on the environment”); Pac. Coast
Fed’n of Fishermen’s Ass’ns v. Blank, 693 F.3d 1084, 1099 (9th Cir. 2012).
81. 753 F.2d 754 (9th Cir. 1985); see also Pac. Coast, 693 F.3d at 1098 (“The crux of
the [independent utility] test is whether each of two projects would have taken place
with or without the other . . . .”).
82. Thomas, 753 F.2d at 758.
83. Id. at 761.
84. Del. River Keeper Network v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 1304,
1313–14 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (“When one of the projects might reasonably have been
completed without the existence of the other, the two projects have independent utility
and are not ‘connected’ for NEPA’s purposes.”).
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segmentation principles appearing in connected actions cases
to play a key role in analyzing the sufficiency of the
environmental reviews undertaken by FERC. After all, the
construction, upgrades, and operation of facilities permitted by
FERC are for the explicit purpose of enabling LNG exports.85
Yet, as discussed below, the D.C. Circuit has thus far declined
to decide whether the Natural Gas Act’s two-tier permitting
process creates “connected actions” that must be analyzed in a
single EIS.86
3.

NEPA Requires Agencies to Work Together

Congress could not have been clearer about directing federal
agencies to conduct environmental reviews jointly.87 Per CEQ
regulations, federal agencies with jurisdiction over different
aspects of a single proposal designate a “lead agency” to
supervise the preparation of a common EIS, with the other
agencies acting as “cooperating agencies.”88 Cooperating
agencies must participate in the scoping process.89
Furthermore, cooperating agencies assume “responsibility for
developing information and preparing environmental
analyses” concerning topics over “which the cooperating agency
has special expertise,” should the lead agency so request. 90
These
requirements
warrant
particular
attention
considering the two-tier permitting structure of the Natural
Gas Act. Recall that the Act designates FERC to be “the lead
agency for the purposes of coordinating all applicable Federal
authorizations and for the purposes of complying with
[NEPA].”91 In practice, DOE participates in FERC’s limited
environmental review as a “cooperating agency,” and
85. See FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, DOE/EIS-0487, FREEPORT LNG
LIQUEFACTION PROJECT PHASE II MODIFICATION PROJECT: FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENT 1-3 (2014).
86. Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 45–46 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2012) (“Prior to making any detailed statement, the
responsible Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal
agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any
environmental impact involved.”).
88. Id. §§ 1501.5, 1501.6, 1508.5, 1508.16.
89. Id. § 1501.6.
90. Id.
91. 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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incorporates the FERC review for purposes of satisfying its
own responsibilities.92 Cooperation between the two agencies
to conduct as complete an environmental review as possible, at
the earliest possible stage, would make practical sense given
that FERC-level decisions about a facility’s capacity
necessarily affect DOE-level decisions about how much LNG
may be exported.
4.

NEPA Requires Agencies to Take a “Hard Look” at
Environmental Impacts at the Earliest Possible Time

In addition to NEPA’s requirements concerning the scope
and procedure of environmental reviews, “timing is one of
NEPA’s central themes. An assessment must be ‘prepared
early enough so that it can serve practically as an important
contribution to the decisionmaking process and will not be
used to rationalize or justify decisions already made.’”93 The
phrase “early enough” means “at the earliest possible time to
insure that planning and decisions reflect environmental
values.”94 By referring to NEPA’s requirements as “action
forcing,”95 the Supreme Court embraced the rule that
environmental reviews “shall be prepared at the feasibility
analysis (go-no go) stage and may be supplemented at a later
stage if necessary.”96
The requirement for environmental reviews to be completed
at the “go-no go” stage has particular ramifications for DOE,
given its thirty-year history of granting conditional approval
for requests to export LNG before completing its

92. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 41–
42 (D.C. Cir. 2016)); see also 40 C.F.R. § 1506.3(a) (2017) (providing that cooperating
agencies may only adopt the EIS of a lead agency if “[it] meets the standards for an
adequate statement under these regulations.”).
93. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2000) (“NEPA’s
effectiveness depends entirely on involving environmental considerations in the initial
decisionmaking process.”); see 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.2, 1502.5 (2017); see also Robertson v.
Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) (explaining that NEPA
“ensures that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available, and will
carefully consider, detailed information concerning significant environmental
impacts”); Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 718 (9th Cir. 1988).
94. Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 351 (1979).
95. Id. at 350.
96. Id. at 351 n.3.
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environmental review.97 In 2014, however, DOE revised its
procedures, stating that it would suspend its practice of
issuing conditional decisions. 98 Whether or not DOE’s new
procedures signal a new commitment to NEPA principles
remains to be seen; DOE has admitted that it will still begin
its public interest analysis prior to completion of NEPA review,
but it will not issue a final decision before the NEPA review is
complete.99
Of course, NEPA does not require that agency officials be
“subjectively impartial,” but “[t]he statute does require . . . that
projects be objectively evaluated” before an agency commits
itself to a particular decision.100 For example, the Ninth Circuit
found that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration, the National Marine Fisheries Service, and
other federal defendants violated NEPA by promising their
support for the Makah Indian Tribe’s proposal for a quota of
gray whales for subsistence and ceremonial use before
undertaking the requisite environmental review.101 In so doing,
the court captured the essence of NEPA: “the comprehensive
‘hard look’ . . . required by the statute must be timely, and it
must be taken objectively and in good faith, not as an exercise
in form over substance, and not as a subterfuge designed to
rationalize a decision already made.”102
II.

PERMITTING IN ACTION: THE CASE IN FREEPORT

In contrast to courts’ consistent opinions holding that
downstream emissions fall within the scope of indirect impacts
that should be reviewed under NEPA in other contexts, courts’
treatment of LNG export facilities has thus far proven
unique.103 For this reason, the Sierra Club’s parallel challenges
97. Procedures for Liquefied Natural Gas Export Decisions, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,132,
48,133 (Aug. 15, 2014).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000).
101. Id. at 1143.
102. Id. at 1142.
103. Michael Burger & Jessica Wentz, Downstream and Upstream Greenhouse Gas
Emissions: The Proper Scope of NEPA Review, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 109, 143
(2017); see also Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373–
74 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (FERC must consider downstream effects of pipelines); Mid States
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to the expansion of the Freeport facility and related exports
deserve careful scrutiny.
In 2004, FERC authorized Freeport to site, construct, and
operate an LNG import terminal on Quintana Island in
Brazoria County, Texas.104 In 2011 and 2012, amid the spike in
domestic gas production, Freeport sought FERC’s approval for
new upgrades and facilities to allow for gas exports.105
Pursuant to its statutory duty to coordinate the environmental
review, FERC prepared an EIS.106 The DOE, the
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of
Transportation, the Army Corps of Engineers, and the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration all
participated in the consolidated environmental review as
cooperating agencies.107
Prior to FERC’s EIS, Freeport separately sought
authorization from DOE to export natural gas. 108 The
Department approved Freeport’s request to export gas to freetrade agreement countries in February 2011—requests that
the Natural Gas Act requires to be approved without delay109—
and gave conditional approval for exporting LNG to the
requested non-free trade countries in May and November
2013, also before FERC released its EIS.110 The Department’s
final authorization, it explained, would be contingent on
satisfactory completion of FERC’s ongoing environmental
review process.111
FERC released its Final EIS in June 2014. 112 Focusing on
the site-specific effects of the construction, it stated that the
Freeport project “would result in some adverse environmental
impacts,” which would be “mostly temporary and short-term[,]”
Coal. for Progress v. Surface Transp. Bd., 345 F.3d 520, 549 (8th Cir. 2003) (agency
must consider effect of reducing the price of coal when approving upgrades to coal rail
line).
104. Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
105. Id.
106. Id.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2012).
Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 42.
Id.
Id.
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provided Freeport implemented the mitigation conditions
FERC proposed.113 FERC proceeded to authorize the
construction, enabling the export of 1.5 billion cubic feet of gas
per day.114 Combining Freeport with the other projects
approved or pending before FERC at the time, FERC had
approved exports totaling 12.5 billion cubic feet per day––a
volume equivalent to 19% of the nation-wide demand for
natural gas.115 DOE adopted FERC’s EIS in full, and approved
Freeport’s application in November 2014. 116
A.

Freeport I: The FERC Review

The Sierra Club intervened in the FERC permitting process
and sought a re-hearing, asserting that FERC’s NEPA analysis
failed to address the indirect impacts of upgrading the
Freeport facilities to pave the way for exporting LNG. Sierra
Club’s basic contention was fairly intuitive: the sole purpose of
the Freeport upgrade and construction project was to export
natural gas and yet FERC’s environmental review failed to
evaluate how exporting natural gas from Freeport would
contribute to rising domestic prices and increased coal
consumption.117 FERC claimed (1) that increases in gas
production and coal use, if any, are caused by the DOE permit,
meaning they are not sufficiently causally related to the
Freeport project; and (2) that these effects were not reasonably
foreseeable to warrant analysis. 118 FERC denied the petition
for re-hearing and, the next day, DOE issued its final order
authorizing Freeport to export natural gas to non-free trade
agreement countries.119

113. Id.
114. Id.; Order Granting Authorizations Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act,
Freeport LNG Development, L.P., 148 FERC ¶ 61,076, 1, 2, 17 (July 30, 2014).
115. Petitioner’s Reply Brief at 10, Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36 (D.C. Cir. July 1, 2015)
(No. 14-1275).
116. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 196 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
117. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 42–43.
118. See id. at 48; Order Denying Rehearing and Clarification, Freeport LNG
Development, L.P., 149 FERC ¶ 61,119, 10 (Nov. 13, 2014).
119. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 43.
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The D.C. Circuit rejected the challenges to FERC’s NEPA
review.120 In doing so, it cited Public Citizen for the proposition
that FERC could lawfully ignore indirect effects of the
anticipated export of natural gas “because the Department of
Energy, not the Commission, has sole authority to license the
export of any natural gas going through the Freeport
facilities.”121 The court explained that in the specific
circumstance where, as here, an agency “has no ability to
prevent a certain effect due to” that agency’s “limited statutory
authority over the relevant action[],” then that action “cannot
be considered a legally relevant ‘cause’ of the effect for NEPA
purposes.”122 According to the court:
The Department’s independent decision to allow
exports—a decision over which the Commission has no
regulatory authority—breaks the NEPA causal chain
and absolves the Commission of responsibility to
include in its NEPA analysis considerations that it
“could not act on” and for which it cannot be “the legally
relevant cause.”123
Sierra Club argued that LNG exports from the Freeport
facility could not occur absent the liquefaction infrastructure
that FERC had authorized, so the fact that subsequent
decisions that would affect the extent of resulting
environmental impacts did not alleviate FERC’s obligation to
assess their nature.124 Additionally, undisputed record
evidence made clear that exporting natural gas requires
increasing domestic natural gas production—sixty to seventy
percent of LNG exports will come from new natural gas
production.125 In other words, it was not just foreseeable that
domestic production would rise to meet demand for exporting
LNG, it had already been foreseen. Therefore, FERC should
have addressed those environmental effects.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id. at 51.
Id. at 47.
Id. (citing Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 771 (2004)).
Id. at 48 (citing Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 769).
See Petitioner’s Reply Brief, supra note 115, at 10.
See id. at 17–18; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 4, at 6.
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The D.C. Circuit appeared to sidestep the foreseeability
argument, reiterating that “critical to triggering that chain of
events is the intervening action of the Department of Energy
in granting an export license.”126 Even though the
environmental impacts would not occur but for FERC’s
approval of the facilities to make export possible, the D.C.
Circuit framed the resolution of the question differently:
because the environmental groups had not identified impacts
that would occur but for the DOE decision to authorize exports,
FERC need not examine the foreseeable effects thereof.127 This
reasoning implicitly suggests that even when an “intervening”
cause is foreseeable—which was certainly the case, given
DOE’s conditional approval of the export—it can still trump
FERC’s obligations to assess the indirect consequences of its
actions.
B.

Freeport II: The DOE Review

While the DOE adopted the EIS prepared by FERC in full, it
also supplemented it with additional reports. An addendum to
the EIS disclosed how increased natural gas drilling would
impact the water, air, and land resources surrounding
production activities, but failed to link any of these impacts to
any particular amount of exports.128 Additionally, the
Department commissioned the National Energy Technology
Laboratory (NETL) to prepare a report on the lifecycle
greenhouse gas emissions of LNG exports. 129 Notably, the
generalized NETL report was applicable to all LNG exports,
thus failing to provide any estimate of the greenhouse gas
emissions associated with the particular export request under

126. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 47–48.
127. Id. at 48 (noting that the challengers had failed to identify “any specific and
causally linear indirect consequences that could reasonably be foreseen and factored
into the Commission’s environmental analysis that exist apart from the intervening
Department of Energy decision to authorize exports”) (emphasis added).
128. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 195 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (citing Addendum to
Environmental Review Documents Concerning Exports of Natural Gas from the
United States, 79 Fed. Reg. 48,132 (Aug. 15, 2014)).
129. NAT’L ENERGY TECH. LAB., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, LIFE CYCLE G REENHOUSE
GAS PERSPECTIVE ON EXPORTING LIQUEFIED NATURAL GAS FROM THE UNITED STATES
(2014) (published at 79 Fed. Reg. 32,260 (June 4, 2014)).
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review.130 As a result, DOE never addressed how much
additional greenhouse gas pollution could be emitted in the
United States as a result of the Freeport proposal. 131
The Sierra Club challenged DOE’s NEPA review because of
the Department’s failure to disclose the domestic upstream
emissions triggered by the volume of gas that would be
exported from the Freeport terminal.132 The generalized
information it had provided was adequate, DOE responded,
because Sierra Club was able to use this information to
develop ballpark estimates of the impacts of induced gas
production for the particular proposal under review.133 The
D.C. Circuit sided with DOE.134 It did not, however, articulate
a reason why, consistent with NEPA requirements, DOE could
avoid estimating the greenhouse gas emissions associated with
the specific exports under review.135
III. CRITICISMS OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S REASONING
The D.C. Circuit’s Freeport I and Freeport II decisions have
effectively created a regulatory void, hiding the domestic
effects of LNG exports from view. 136 Thus, despite DOE’s own
recognition that environmental effects are a component of its
public interest determination imposed by the Natural Gas
Act,137 the Department remains free to conclude that the
benefits of approval outweigh its environmental impacts
without ever having adequately identified those impacts. This
outcome runs counter to NEPA’s “twin aims” of ensuring that

130. Jessica Wentz, Fossil Fuel Projects and NEPA Reviews: Two New Decisions on
the Proper Scope of Analysis for Indirect and Cumulative Greenhouse Gas Emissions,
WESTLAW J. ENVTL., Sept. 2017, at 3, 3.
131. Freeport II, 867 F.3d at 198–202.
132. Petitioner’s Final Reply Brief at 27, Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189 (D.C. Cir. July 5,
2016) (No. 15-1489).
133. Answering Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 57.
134. Freeport II, 867 F.3d at 196–97.
135. Id.
136. Wentz, supra note 130, at 3.
137. See Answering Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 60 (noting DOE’s duty is
to identify and evaluate the factors relevant to the public interest, specifically listing
environmental factors); see also id. at 36 (noting DOE considered a study estimating
indirect greenhouse gas emissions across all proposed exports, but not the specific
facility at issue).
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federal agencies have considered the environmental impacts of
a proposed action and that the public is made aware of these
environmental consequences.138
A.

Freeport I’s Misapplication of Public Citizen

In deciding that FERC did not have to analyze exportinduced gas production because DOE’s decision to allow
exports “breaks the NEPA causal chain and absolves the
Commission of responsibility,” the Freeport I court broadened
and misapplied Public Citizen.139 As recounted in Section I.B.1,
Public Citizen resolved a challenge to the environmental
review undertaken by FMCSA before unveiling the safety
regulations allowing President Bush to officially authorize
Mexican motor carriers to operate in the United States. Reparsing Public Citizen reveals how the D.C. Circuit has
misapplied its holdings.
In Public Citizen, the Supreme Court found that FMCSA did
not violate NEPA by failing to discuss the greenhouse gas
emissions sure to be released by the increase in Mexican
trucks operating in the United States for two reasons. First,
the Supreme Court found that the FMCSA regulations were
not sufficiently responsible for the increased pollution caused
by the trucks because the President would still need to lift the
moratorium allowing more Mexican motor vehicles to travel
north.140 Recall that FMCSA only promulgated its rules to
establish the safety inspection regime for Mexican trucks after
President Bush announced that he intended to authorize the
operation of Mexican trucks within the United States, 141 but
Congress had barred FMCSA from spending funds to process
applications for Mexican trucks to operate in the United States
until it issued safety-monitoring rules.142 Thus, FMCSA’s

138. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 347 (1989);
Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 462 U.S. 87, 97 (1983).
139. Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing U.S. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub.
Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 769 (2004)).
140. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. at 770.
141. Id. at 760.
142. Id.
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decision on the safety regulations would not necessarily affect
the number of trucks that would enter the country.143
Not only was the agency powerless to change the President’s
decision to lift the moratorium on Mexican trucks, but FMCSA
had no authority to mitigate any potential environmental
impacts of the President’s decision. FMCSA governs motor
carrier safety; it had no statutory authority to impose or
enforce emissions controls.144 The agency’s limited discretion
raised questions about its ability to act on the information that
it would have gleaned from completing an EIS.145 The Court
reasoned:
[R]equiring FMCSA to consider the environmental
effects of the entry of Mexican trucks would fulfill
neither of the statutory purposes [of ensuring that the
agency, in reaching its decision, would have available,
and would carefully consider, detailed information
concerning significant environmental impacts and of
guaranteeing that relevant information would be made
available to the larger audience that might also play a
role in both the decisionmaking process and
implementation of that decision].146
Put simply, FMCSA would be unable to act on the findings
of an EIS even if it conducted one.147 As a result, Public
Citizen is likely best understood as a case applying an “implied
exemption,”148 which releases agencies from NEPA obligations
when they undertake “non-discretionary” actions. If an agency
can characterize its action as nondiscretionary, most (if not all)
circuits recognize an implied exemption from NEPA’s

143. Id.
144. Id. at 758–59.
145. Id. at 770 (noting the FMCSA had “no ability to prevent a certain effect due to
its limited statutory authority over the relevant actions”).
146. Id. at 768.
147. Id. at 769.
148. See generally Kyle Robisch, The NEPA Implied Exemption Doctrine: How a
Novel and Creeping Common Law Exemption Threatens to Undermine the National
Environmental Policy Act, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 173 (2014); J.B. Ruhl & Kyle Robisch,
Agencies Running from Discretion, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 97 (2016).
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requirements.149 The logic is simple: NEPA was designed to
introduce environmental considerations into the decisionmaking processes of agencies that have the ability to react to
environmental consequences when taking action, but if an
agency’s course is predetermined, no measure of
environmental impacts could sway the agency’s course of
action. In fact, commentators have argued that today’s
Supreme Court would likely uphold the implied exemption
doctrine, citing Public Citizen as evidence.150
Given this background, it becomes apparent that had the
Freeport I court applied a narrow reading of Public Citizen, it
would have found the case easily distinguishable from the
issues it faced in the LNG export context. The decision to
ultimately allow Mexican trucks to cross the border—the
“intervening cause” of the increased truck emissions—was to
be made by the President. As one scholar aptly details, the
government litigated the Public Citizen case on the theory that
it presented an issue not of interpreting NEPA, but of
presidential discretion, arguing that the President “must be
able to act quickly and with assurance to implement the
decisions that are entrusted personally to him,” and that any
ruling to the contrary would have massive international trade
ramifications.151 In the LNG context, however, the “intervening
cause” is a co-equal agency already required to join the
environmental review.
Nor does the FERC-DOE decision-making process in the
LNG context mimic the FMCSA-Presidential two-step in
Public Citizen. In Public Citizen, the President made his
decision to lift the moratorium before FMCSA issued its
regulations; the analogous situation would be if DOE had
approved a permit to export natural gas before FERC
authorized the construction of facilities necessary to do so. Yet
in the context of LNG exports, FERC must make a
determination that authorizing the construction or
149. Robisch, supra note 148, at 186 (collecting cases); see also Sierra Club v.
Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502, 1512 (9th Cir. 1995) (collecting cases demonstrating that
nondiscretionary agency action is excused from the operation of NEPA).
150. Robisch, supra note 148, at 193.
151. Jeannette MacMillan, An International Dispute Reveals Weaknesses in
Domestic Environmental Law: NAFTA, NEPA, and the Case of Mexican Trucks
(Department of Transportation v. Public Citizen), 32 ECOLOGY L.Q. 491, 511 (2005).
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modification of an export facility is not contrary to the public
interest. FERC alone approves permits for constructing the
facilities necessary to export gas, and it has broad authority to
impose any conditions on approval deemed “necessary or
appropriate.”152 Thus, unlike FMCSA, FERC does have the
ability to prevent the LNG exports and their inevitable effects.
After all, FERC authorization for modifying facilities or
liquefying a particular capacity of natural gas for export quite
literally makes the exports possible.
Additionally, requiring FERC to estimate and disclose the
upstream greenhouse gas pollution caused by producing
additional gas for export would ensure that FERC had
considered the potentially significant environmental impacts of
its authorizations. This information is especially critical in the
context of exports to free trade nations, which DOE must
automatically authorize. 153 Assessing the upstream impacts of
exports by FERC at the construction stage may be the only
time to make such information available “to a larger audience
that might also play role in both decision making process and
implementation of that decision.”154
The D.C. Circuit’s recent decision in Sierra Club v. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission lays bare the trouble with
Freeport I’s broad reading of Public Citizen. Recall that in
Sierra Club, the D.C. Circuit required FERC to examine the
greenhouse gas emissions resulting from power plants served
by FERC-approved pipelines—despite the fact that in Florida,
new power plants must receive a separate state permit. Recharacterizing Freeport I, the D.C. Circuit wrote:
[O]ur holding in the LNG cases was not based solely on
the fact that a second agency’s approval was necessary
before the environmental effect at issue could occur.
Rather, [Freeport I] and its companion cases rested on
the premise that FERC had no legal authority to
152. See 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(1) (2012) (granting the Commission “the exclusive
authority to approve or deny an application for the siting, construction, expansion, or
operation of an [export] terminal”); 15 U.S.C. § 717b(e)(3)(A) (2012) (authorizing the
Commission to impose any conditions on those terminals that it finds to be “necessary
or appropriate”).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(c) (2012).
154. Dep’t of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752, 768 (2004).
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prevent the adverse environmental effects of natural
gas exports.155
As the D.C. Circuit asks rhetorically: then “[w]hat did the
[Freeport I] court mean by its statement that FERC could not
prevent the effects of exports? After all, FERC did have legal
authority to deny an upgrade license for a natural gas export
terminal.”156 The answer, the court concludes, is that “FERC
was forbidden to rely on the effects of gas exports as a
justification for denying an upgrade license,” citing Motor
Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Automobile
Insurance Co.157 for the proposition that an agency acts
arbitrarily and capriciously if it makes a decision based on
“factors which Congress had not intended it to consider.”158
According to the court, because FERC was operating pursuant
to a “narrow” delegation of authority from the DOE, the
Commission “would have acted unlawfully had it refused an
upgrade license on grounds that it did not have delegated
authority to consider.”159
Even the D.C. Circuit’s attempted re-characterization
strains credulity. First, the D.C. Circuit describes FERC’s
delegated authority as “narrow,” but provides no citation for
limitations on the factors that FERC could consider in its own
public interest determination. 160 Nor did the Sierra Club court
acknowledge a prior statement by the D.C. Circuit in Freeport
I that expressly reserved consideration of the scope of FERC’s
delegated authority.161 This is perhaps no surprise; the
Natural Gas Act explicitly provides that applications for
constructing LNG facilities may be approved “in whole or in
part. . .[w]ith such modification and upon such terms and
conditions as the Commission may find necessary or

155. Sierra Club v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 867 F.3d 1357, 1373 (D.C. Cir.
2017).
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
Sierra Club, 867 F.3d at 1373.
Id.
See id.
Wentz, supra note 130, at 3.
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appropriate.”162 FERC itself even explicitly stated that its
refusal to consider the effects of increased gas production was
based on a conclusion that NEPA did not so require, not
because these effects fell within DOE’s authority.163
Second, and more importantly, if the D.C. Circuit’s Sierra
Club reasoning is replicated by other courts, then the scope of
a NEPA analysis becomes only as broad as substantive
mandates of the underlying act. NEPA then becomes only a
piggy-back statute rather than a standalone law that infuses
an environmental consciousness into the decision-making of all
federal agencies, no matter their underlying substantive
mandates. Put another way, even if it would be arbitrary and
capricious for FERC to deny a permit on environmental
grounds, NEPA still imposes an independent duty on FERC to
consider the direct and indirect consequences of its actions.
There is no doubt that Freeport and other companies with
pending proposals to export LNG cheered the D.C. Circuit’s
Freeport I decision. However, the Court’s opinion—and
subsequent attempted re-characterizations—failed to both
recognize the eccentricities of Public Citizen and appreciate
that NEPA imposes a separate, independent duty on FERC,
untethered to the Natural Gas Act.
B.

Freeport II’s Failure to Require the Department of Energy
to Examine Upstream Greenhouse Gas Emissions

Freeport II, which held that DOE could lawfully ignore the
domestic greenhouse gas emissions caused by authorizing gas
export from the Freeport facility, faces a different set of
criticisms. The D.C. Circuit agreed that DOE’s generalized
impact assessment was not tailored to any specific level of
exports but nonetheless upheld the analysis. 164 It did not
explain why, consistent with NEPA, DOE could avoid
162. 15 U.S.C. § 717b(a) (2012). The Commission has plenary authority to condition
its approvals of LNG facilities under section 3 of the Natural Gas Act. See Order
Granting Authorizations Under Section 3 of the Natural Gas Act, Freeport LNG
Development, L.P., 148 FERC ¶ 61,076, 8 n.12 (July 30, 2014) (citing Distrigas Corp.
v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 495 F.2d 1057, 1063–64 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
834 (1974), and Dynegy LNG Production Terminal, L.P., 97 FERC ¶ 61,231 (2001)).
163. See Order Denying Rehearing and Clarification, Freeport LNG Development,
L.P., 149 FERC ¶ 61,119, 10 (Nov. 13, 2014); see also supra text accompanying note 24.
164. Freeport II, 867 F.3d 189, 197 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
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estimating the upstream greenhouse gas emissions associated
with the specific exports under review.165
The court’s failure is particularly striking. NEPA “ensures
that the agency, in reaching its decision, will have available,
and will carefully consider, detailed information concerning
significant environmental impacts[.]”166 And not only had DOE
explicitly recognized that “environmental factors” fall within
the scope of its public interest review for export authorizations,
but the Department had already generated all of the modeling
it would need to estimate domestic upstream emissions
associated with the particular proposal it was reviewing.167
At bottom, there is simply no reason, consistent with NEPA,
for DOE to exclude consideration of these domestic upstream
emissions. For DOE to recognize that LNG exports will
increase the demand for natural gas production,168 that this
increased demand will result in increased domestic production
of natural gas from unconventional sources,169 and that it has
the tools to model associated emissions but refused to do so
should have concerned the D.C. Circuit.
IV. THE PATH FORWARD: TOWARD A UNIFIED FERCDOE ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW
As the D.C. Circuit itself pointed out, the Freeport I decision
did not decide whether FERC “impermissibly ‘segmented’ its
review of the Freeport Projects from the larger inter-agency
export authorization process, and ‘thereby fail[ed] to address
the true scope and impact of the activities that should be under
consideration.’”170 Nor did it decide whether the “Commission’s

165. Id. at 200–01.
166. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989)
(emphasis added).
167. Answering Brief for Respondent, supra note 30, at 56.
168. Id. at 53; U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 4, at 6 (natural gas exports
would be offset by increased production).
169. U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, ADDENDUM TO ENVIRONMENTAL REVIEW DOCUMENTS
CONCERNING EXPORTS OF NATURAL GAS FROM THE UNITED STATES 1–2 (2014) (“LNG
export volumes would be offset by some combination of increased domestic production
of natural gas (principally from unconventional sources), decreased domestic
consumption of natural gas, and an adjustment to the U.S. net trade balance in
natural gas with Canada and Mexico.”).
170. Freeport I, 827 F.3d 36, 45 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (citing Del. Riverkeeper Network v.
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construction authorizations and the Department’s export
authorizations qualified as ‘connected actions’ for purposes of
NEPA review.”171 Therefore, advocates seeking to require
disclosure of the upstream effects of natural gas exports before
the agencies have already given their approval could seek to
require a unified environmental review process by
characterizing the two permits as “connected actions.” This
strategy would have the benefit of significant support from
NEPA case law and the structure of the Natural Gas Act itself.
As discussed in section I.B.2, the problem of segmentation is
nothing new. When a federal agency reviews a number of
related actions—such as proposals to upgrade different
sections of the same pipeline system—it may attempt to
narrow the scope of the environmental review by preparing
impact statements on each action individually rather than for
the entire group. The tunnel vision created by improper
segmentation
is
especially
problematic
where
the
environmental impact of the whole project is greater than the
sum of its component parts.
Applying these principles, the permit to construct and
operate an LNG export facility and the export permit are, in
effect, a single course of action that require a single impact
statement.172 First, FERC’s granting of a construction permit
automatically triggers another action that requires NEPA
review: a permit for exporting natural gas.
Second, granting a permit for construction or modifying a
facility depends on the DOE export permit for its
justification—a fact that FERC has explicitly admitted. 173 To
put it in terms of the “utility test,” modifying or constructing
an export facility would have no value except for exporting gas.
FERC has also capitulated on this point, affirmatively stating
that the Freeport upgrade project would only be financially
feasible if DOE authorized exports.174
Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 753 F.3d 1304, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 2014)).
171. Freeport I, 827 F.3d at 45–46 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1)).
172. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.4(a) (2017).
173. FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N, supra note 85Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 1-3 (noting that the Freeport Project’s sole purpose is to facilitate
exporting natural gas).
174. Order Denying Rehearing and Clarification, Freeport LNG Development, L.P.,
149 FERC ¶ 61,119, 21 (Nov. 13, 2014) (“Had DOE denied Freeport LNG any
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In general, successful challenges to broaden the scope of an
agency’s review based on a “connected actions” theory involve a
single agency’s segmentation of two separate projects, both
under review by that same agency. But perhaps the logic of
“connected actions” does not change if one agency’s action
triggers another agency’s action, especially when the two
agencies are operating under a responsibility-sharing
mechanism like the Natural Gas Act. Indeed, at least one court
has rebuffed an agency’s attempt to shirk a responsibility for
reviewing connected actions under the authority of a separate
agency.175
In addition to drawing on segmentation cases, advocates
should look to both the Natural Gas Act and CEQ regulations
requiring interagency, unified review. CEQ regulations require
agencies with jurisdiction over different aspects of a proposal
to conduct joint environmental reviews by designating a “lead
agency” to supervise the preparation of a common EIS with the
other agencies acting as “cooperating agencies.”176 The Natural
Gas Act itself designates FERC as “the lead agency for the
purposes of coordinating all applicable Federal authorizations
and for the purposes of complying with [NEPA].”177 Reading
these provisions together supports the notion that the Natural
Gas Act does not envision the bifurcated NEPA review that
courts have imposed. In other words, upon receiving requests
to modify facilities and export natural gas, FERC and DOE

authorization to export the commodity, it is highly unlikely that the company would
have pursued its application before the Commission to construct facilities, because
without commodity authorization, the facilities would have no use. Similarly, if DOE
ultimately denies export authorization, the project would likely no longer be
financially feasible, notwithstanding the Commission’s issuance of its section 3
authorization to construct the facilities.”).
175. See Colo. Wild Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., 523 F. Supp. 2d 1213, 1225 (D. Colo.
2007) (suggesting that an action meeting the regulatory definition of a “connected
action” nonetheless can be analyzed as a “connected action” in an EIS even if the
decision-making agency does not have authority to control it); see also Burger &
Wentz, supra note 103, at 171 (suggesting that connected actions argument “could be
made even in the context of different types of approvals conducted by different
agencies––for example, the approval of a coal lease or mining plan and the approval of
a rail line that would service those mines may constitute “connected actions” that lack
independent utility and should thus be reviewed in a single NEPA document.”)
176. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.5, 1501.6, 1508.5, 1508.16 (2017).
177. 15 U.S.C. § 717n(b)(1) (2012) (emphasis added).
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should lead a comprehensive environmental review prior to the
construction stage.
A third justification for requiring a unified review at the
construction stage flows from one of NEPA’s key purposes:
requiring agencies to look before they leap. Per CEQ
regulations, an agency should begin its NEPA review process
as soon as possible, when it is “actively preparing to make a
decision.”178 The purpose of frontloading the review process is
“so that it can serve practically as an important contribution to
the decision making process and will not be used to rationalize
or justify decisions already made.”179 Yet the bifurcated review
process, wherein DOE participates as a “cooperating agency”
during FERC’s environmental review of the LNG facilities but
undertakes its own separate inquiry to approve the actual
export of LNG, makes it difficult to imagine a situation where
DOE would participate in the approval of upgrading the
physical facilities necessary for exporting LNG but then deny
applications to do so. It may be too much to ask for FERC and
DOE to be objective regarding the merits of exporting LNG,
but NEPA still requires these projects to be objectively
evaluated.180
CONCLUSION
Challenges to the environmental reviews conducted by
FERC and DOE in conjunction with proposals to export LNG
have, so far, failed across the board. The result: no agency is
required to disclose the upstream greenhouse gas emissions
associated with approving LNG exports.181 This void is
contrary to NEPA, which imposes on the federal government a
continuing responsibility to ensure that decision-making
occurs before a federal action leads to an irreparable
environmental change. The D.C. Circuit has allowed FERC
and DOE to upend these basic requirements by skirting NEPA
procedures that require agencies to tailor their environmental

178.
179.
180.
181.

40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (2017).
Id. §§ 1501.2, 1502.5 (emphasis added).
Metcalf v. Daley, 214 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 2000).
Wentz, supra note 130, at 3–4.
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reviews to include the indirect effects of a particular action and
connected actions—and to do so jointly, in a unified review.
But environmental advocates seeking to expand reviews by
FERC and DOE need not give up hope. The D.C. Circuit’s
recent jurisprudence offers some indication that the court may
be divided on the question of how to draw the line around
indirect effects. In order to breathe new life into NEPA and
provide the public with necessary information about the
domestic effects of promoting a substantial increase in LNG
exports, environmental advocates could consider both revisiting the central holding of Public Citizen and traditional
NEPA segmentation principles to bolster future claims.
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